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Matal v. Tam: Free Speech Meets
“Disparaging” Trademarks in the
Supreme Court
Niki Kuckes*
INTRODUCTION

In Matal v. Tam,1 which was decided at the end of the Supreme
Court’s 2016 term, the Court relied on the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment2 to strike down part of Section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act.3 This longstanding provision of federal trademark
law had allowed the government to refuse registration to
trademarks found to “disparage” persons or groups.4 The collision
between trademark law and Free Speech presented in Matal v. Tam
turned out to pose surprisingly challenging legal issues.5 While all
eight Justices participating agreed that the provision was
unconstitutional,6 there was less consensus on why it was
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law.
1. 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 2.
3. Lanham Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
4. Federal trademark law (known as the Lanham Act) provided in
relevant part as follows:
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on
the principal register on account of its nature unless it—(a) Consists
of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter
which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons,
living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them
into contempt, or disrepute . . . .
Id.
5. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751.
6. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the decision of the case. Id. at 1750.
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unconstitutional, and no consensus as to the proper level of scrutiny
for assessing such a challenge.7 As this Survey reflects, where
matters touch on “commercial speech,”8 there are serious open
issues in First Amendment doctrine that the Court failed to resolve
in Matal v. Tam.9
The case began when Simon Tam, the leader of an AsianAmerican rock band, sought to register “The Slants” as a trademark
for his band.10 In choosing the band name “The Slants”—a term
understood by many as a derogatory reference to AsianAmericans—Tam consciously intended to “reclaim” an ethnic slur
as a source of ethnic pride.11 After considering the evidence
relating to linguistic uses of the term “slants,” and its derogatory
use in relation to Asian-Americans, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) concluded that the term “The Slants”
was “disparaging” to a substantial part of the Asian-American
community and refused to register it.12
Tam appealed to the Federal Circuit, challenging both the
agency’s conclusion that his mark was “disparaging,” and the
constitutionality of the Lanham Act provision allowing the agency
to reject “disparaging” trademarks.13 In a striking turn of events,
7. Compare id. at 1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that the case
should be considered under a “heightened scrutiny” standard), and id. at 1769
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the case should be resolved under the
“strict scrutiny” test), with id. at 1764 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (concluding
that the Court need not resolve the dispute as to whether the case should be
resolved under the intermediate scrutiny test for commercial speech or under
a different test).
8. See id. at 1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1769 (Thomas, J.,
concurring); id. at 1764 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion).
9. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744.
10. Id. at 1751 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion).
11. See In re Tam (Tam En Banc Decision), 808 F.3d 1321, 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016); see also Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1754 (Mr. Tam
named his band The Slants “to ‘reclaim’ and ‘take ownership’ of stereotypes
about people of Asian ethnicity.”).
12. In re Tam, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305, 1310 (T.T.A.B. 2013) (finding
“The Slants” mark to be disqualified from registration under Section 2(a)
because “a substantial composite of the referenced group find the term
objectionable.”).
13.
See In re Tam (Tam Panel Decision), 785 F.3d 567, 569 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(“Mr. Tam argues that the Board erred in finding the mark THE SLANTS
disparaging under § 2(a) of the Lanham Act and therefore unregistrable. Mr.
Tam also challenges the constitutionality of § 2(a).”), reh’g en banc granted,
opinion vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir.), and reh’g en banc, 808 F.3d 1321
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the Federal Circuit sitting en banc used the case as the occasion to
issue a major constitutional decision. In In re Tam, the court
invalidated the disparagement provision of federal trademark law,
which had been in place since 1946, and had been used for decades
to reject trademark registrations.14 In so doing, the Federal Circuit
reversed its own established precedent that Section 2(a)’s bar on
“disparaging” trademarks did not violate the First Amendment.15
Beyond overturning its dated precedent, a majority of the
Federal Circuit articulated a new, dual-standard approach to free
speech challenges in the commercial context: It held that the courts
should review the government’s action strictly when it is directed
at the “expressive character” of a trademark, but more leniently
when it is directed at the “commercial-speech function of the
mark.”16 While traditional free speech doctrine begins by focusing
on the character of the speech in order to decide on a framework for
review,17 the Federal Circuit shifted to an emphasis on the focus of
the government rule.18 The decision generated a total of five
opinions, including the majority, concurring, and dissenting

(Fed. Cir.), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted sub nom., Lee v. Tam, 137
S. Ct. 30 (2016), and aff’d sub nom., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
14.
See Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1358 (“We hold that the
disparagement provision of § 2(a) is unconstitutional because it violates the
First Amendment.”).
15.
See In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (holding that
“[n]o conduct is proscribed, and no tangible form of expression is suppressed.
Consequently, appellant’s First Amendment rights would not be abridged by
the refusal to register his mark [under Section 2(a)].”); see also In re Fox, 702
F.3d 633, 635 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (following In re McGinley’s holding); see also In
re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that
the mark was unable to be registered under section 2(a) because it contained
“scandalous matter”); In re Mavety Media Grp., 33 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (quoting In re McGinley, 660 F.2d at 484).
16.
See Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1338 (“The disparagement
provision must be assessed under First Amendment standards applicable to
what it targets, which is not the commercial-speech function of the mark . . . .
This is not a government regulation aimed at the commercial component of
speech.”).
17.
See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N. Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S.
781, 787 (1988) (“We began our analysis by categorizing the type of speech at
issue.”).
18.
For the reasons discussed below, this analysis represents an
intriguing shift in the focus of the judicial analysis, but the particular
formulation adopted by the Federal Circuit is problematic. See infra Section
IV.A.
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opinions, each offering different First Amendment theories.19
When the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, the appeal
generated an intense flurry of interest, resulting in a stack of
amicus curiae briefs on all sides of the issue from public interest
groups, bar organizations, civil rights groups, law professors, and
professional football organizations.20 Between the federal
government’s defense of the law, Tam’s defense of the ruling below,
and the views expressed by the numerous amici, there were a
bewildering variety of proposals as to how the Court should
approach the First Amendment free speech issue.
It is perhaps not surprising that the case generated split
decisions in the Supreme Court, just as it had in the Federal
Circuit.21 There was complete agreement within the Court that the
“disparagement” provision of Section 2(a) was unconstitutional
under the First Amendment.22 All members of the Court also
agreed on a well-established bedrock free speech principle: “Speech
may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that
offend.”23 Simply because Mr. Tam’s mark is offensive to other
19.
See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct 1744, 1754–55 (2017) (Alito, J.) (majority
opinion) (summarizing the “assortment of theories” expressed in the opinions
generated in the en banc Federal Circuit decision).
20.
Matal v. Tam Docket, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S. (Sep. 25, 2017),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/151293.htm (listing amicus briefs filed). As this list hints, the outcome of the
case was of direct interest to the Washington Redskins professional football
team, whose team name was being challenged on the same legal grounds. See
infra Section II.
21.
Justice Alito wrote an opinion announcing the judgment of the Court
and an opinion of the Court as to Parts I, II, and III-A of his opinion. Tam, 137
S. Ct. 1744. Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion, concurring only in Parts I, II,
and III-A of the Alito opinion and concurring in the judgment. Id. at 1767
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Thomas wrote an opinion, concurring in all
parts of the Alito opinion except for Part II and concurring in the judgment.
Id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring).
22.
Id. at 1765 (plurality opinion) (deciding that “[f]or these reasons, we
hold that the disparagement clause violates the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment. The judgment of the Federal Circuit is affirmed.”); see also id. at
1750 (majority opinion) (laying out the voting tally, which shows that all
Justices participating concurred in the Supreme Court’s judgment).
23.
Id. at 1751 (Alito, J.) (announcing the judgment of the Court and an
opinion of the Court as to Parts I, II, and III-A); see also id. at 1765 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (“[I]t is a fundamental principle of the First Amendment that
the government may not punish or suppress speech based on disapproval of
the ideas or perspectives the speech conveys.”).
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Asian-Americans does not provide a constitutionally justifiable
reason for the government to burden his speech by denying him the
legal status afforded to registered trademarks.24 Beyond that,
however, there was little common ground in the Justices’ reasoning.
The split opinions in Matal v. Tam sowed further confusion on the
issue of what degree of constitutional free speech protection should
be afforded to “commercial speech,” and indeed, what even
constitutes “commercial speech” in this context.25
The discussion of these interesting constitutional questions
proceeds below as follows: Part I lays the groundwork by explaining
the significance of trademark registration and the benefits that a
trademark owner derives from registration (and that are denied
when registration is refused); Part II lays out the Supreme Court
opinions in Matal v. Tam and explains the areas of constitutional
agreement; Part III outlines the areas of constitutional dispute in
Matal v. Tam, and parses the splintered decisions the case
produced; and finally, Part IV analyzes which approach to the free
speech issues presented is the most coherent way to approach the
First Amendment in this context.
I.

TRADEMARK REGISTRATION AND THE LEGAL BENEFITS THAT
FOLLOW

Because the federal trademark registration scheme embodied
in the Lanham Act26 is not a matter of common knowledge, a few
basic points about trademarks are essential in order to understand
the free speech issues addressed in Matal v. Tam.27 Three points,
in particular, are important here: First, it is true that trademark
rights are not created by federal law, and that a mark may be used
by the owner whether or not it is federally registered, but at the
same time, the significance of this “right” should not be
understated;28 Second, federal registration requirements are not
demanding, and successful federal registration of a trademark
vastly expands the legal rights held by the owner of the mark both

24.
Id. at 1763 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (quoting Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55–56 (1988)).
25.
See id.; id. at 1765 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
26. Lanham Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012).
27. See 137 S. Ct. at 1757 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion).
28. See infra Section I.A.
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substantively and procedurally;29 and Third, the “disparagement”
provision at issue here is a small part of a broader federal
regulatory program designed to protect rights in the commercial
sphere and prevent unfair trade practices.30 These points are little
understood by those who do not practice trademark law, but highly
relevant when turning to the proper interpretation of the First
Amendment as applied to Mr. Tam’s trademark dispute.
A. The “Right” to Use a Trademark Without Federal Registration
A trademark—such as “The Slants” for Mr. Tam’s band—is
defined as “any word, symbol, name or other device . . . used by a
person . . . to identify and distinguish [a trademark owner’s
goods] . . . from those manufactured or sold by others.”31 Such a
mark provides a powerful way for a seller to promote and
distinguish his or her products or services in the commercial
marketplace.32
A consumer need only look around to see the power of branding
and the value of trademarks. From McDonald’s golden arches, to
Apple’s distinctive white apple silhouette, to Nike’s “Just Do It,”
there is no question that product trademarks, logos, and slogans
are instantly recognizable to consumers—and thereby highly
valuable to companies. While the definition of a “trademark”33
comes from the Lanham Act, trademarks are not created by federal
law. A trademark owner’s right to claim a particular mark to
identify his goods or services was recognized at common law long
before the federal Lanham Act created a national trademark
registry in 1946.34
29. See infra Section I.B.
30. See infra Section I.C.
31. Lanham Act § 45.
32. While “trademarks” refer to marks used in connection with the sale of
goods, the Act also allows for registration of other types of marks for products
and services, including service marks, collective marks, and certification
marks. See id. In the text above and below, all of these are collectively referred
to as “trademarks.”
33. Id.
34. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (“Trademarks and their
precursors have ancient origins, and trademarks were protected at common
law and in equity at the time of the founding of our country.” (citations
omitted)); see also, e.g., 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:8 (4th ed. 2015).
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This history is significant here for two reasons: first, it
underscores the nature of a trademark as the owner’s private
speech; and second, it follows that a trademark owner can use a
trademark whether or not it is registered. The latter principle—
that trademark owners still have the “right” to use their trademark
even if registration is denied—was the basis for the original Federal
Circuit holding that the agency’s power to refuse registration to
“disparaging” trademarks did not implicate any free speech
rights.35 In In re McGinley, the Federal Circuit reasoned that,
because rejecting a trademark from registration, “does not affect
[the owner’s] right to use it,” there could be no possible abridgement
of the owner’s First Amendment rights.36 While the government
raised the same rationale here, this point was rightly rejected by
both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court as an unduly
limited view of free speech rights.37 Modern Supreme Court
doctrine recognizes that a burden on speech can violate the First
Amendment as much as an outright ban.38
Moreover, while a trademark owner has an ostensible legal
right to use a mark even without registration, the value of this
“right” should not be overstated. As the Federal Circuit has
emphasized, it is “widely recognized that federal trademark
registration bestows truly significant and financially valuable
benefits upon markholders”—benefits unavailable if federal
registration is denied.39 No competent trademark attorney would
advise a client that it makes no difference whether or not the
client’s trademark is federally registered.40
35. See Tam Panel Decision, 785 F.3d 567, 571–72 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
36. 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (“With respect to appellant’s First
Amendment rights, it is clear that the PTO’s refusal to register appellant’s
mark does not affect his right to use it . . . [n]o conduct is proscribed, and no
tangible form of expression is suppressed. Consequently, appellant’s First
Amendment rights would not be abridged by the refusal to register his mark.”
(citation omitted)).
37. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1753; Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1339
(rejecting the government’s argument that Section 2(a) “does not implicate the
First Amendment because it does not prohibit any speech”).
38. See, e.g., Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1340 (noting that
“[l]awmakers may no more silence unwanted speech by burdening its utterance
than by censoring its content” (citation omitted)).
39. See id. (citation omitted).
40. See Lee Ann W. Lockridge, Abolishing State Trademark
Registrations, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 597, 605 (2011) (“[T]he incentives
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B. The Benefits Afforded by Federal Registration
Federal requirements for registering a trademark are not
onerous.41 To qualify for federal registration, the owner must be
seeking to register a trademark that is capable of “distinguishing”
the goods or services from those offered by others in the same
market (and not already in use for that purpose by another
trademark owner).42 The owner of the mark must also show, or be
prepared to show, that the trademark is being used “in commerce”
in connection with particular goods or services.43
If a trademark used to identify goods or services meets the test
for “distinctiveness,” and is actually used in commerce by the
trademark owner in selling the relevant goods or services, the
trademark owner is presumptively entitled to federal registration
of the trademark—and the agency has only limited grounds on
which it may deny registration, including the “disparagement”
provision at issue in Matal v. Tam.44 The trademark “The Slants”
for a rock band would thus have qualified for federal registration
but for the agency’s finding that it was “disparaging” to other

to pursue federal registration . . . are now so significant as to make federal
registration indispensable for any owner making an informed decision about
its trademark rights. A federal registration is the only rational choice . . . .”).
41. See Lanham Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012) (setting out requirements
for trademarks registrable on the principal register). The Lanham Act actually
establishes two national trademark registries. First, the “Principal Register”
is for registering trademarks that are being “used in commerce” or as to which
the applicant has a “bona fide” intent to use in commerce within the near
future. See id. §§ 1(a)(1), (b)(1). Second, the “Supplemental Register” is for
registering trademarks that are “capable of distinguishing the applicant’s
goods or services” but not yet registrable on the Principal Register. See id.
§ 23(a). Because trademarks on the Supplemental Register do not yet get the
full protections of trademark law, and because the Supplemental Register is
not otherwise important for purposes of Tam, the discussion will address only
registration in the context of the Principal Register.
42. See id. § 2 (“No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration” except on
specified and limited grounds.).
43. See id. § 1(a)(1) (“The owner of a trademark used in commerce may
request registration of its trademark on the principal register . . . .”).
44. See id. § 2 (stating that “[n]o trademark by which the goods of the
applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused
registration on the principal register on account of its nature unless” subject
to an express exception).
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members of the Asian-American community.45
Successful registration of a trademark dramatically expands
the trademark owner’s rights, both as a substantive matter and as
a procedural matter.46 The Supreme Court has emphasized, in its
trademark decisions, that the “Lanham Act confers important legal
rights and benefits on trademark owners who register their
marks.”47 This emphasis is important for First Amendment
purposes because free speech rights can be infringed in many ways,
including through the denial of benefits.
Most importantly, federally registering a trademark expands
the substantive legal rights held by the trademark owner.48 In the
absence of federal registration, if a trademark owner has any
common law rights, they are “limited to the territory in which the
mark is known and recognized” by consumers.49 In passing the
Lanham Act, Congress consciously set about to expand upon
common law protection by giving the owner of a federally registered
trademark the right to exclusive nationwide use of that mark.50
This statutory right to nationwide use of a federally registered
trademark excludes only those limited geographic areas, if any, in
which another person’s use of the same mark for the same product
precedes federal registration.51 Federal registration of a mark

45. See Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(“Under the Lanham Act, the PTO must register source-identifying
trademarks unless the mark falls into one of several categories of marks
precluded from registration.”).
46. See MCCARTHY, supra note 34, at §§ 19:9, :11 (“Registration of a mark
on the federal Principal Register confers a number of procedural and
substantive legal advantages over reliance on common law rights . . .
[r]egistration on the Principal Register should be attempted if it is at all
possible.”).
47. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1300
(2015) (internal quotations omitted).
48.
See, e.g., Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1345 (“Federal
trademark registration brings with it valuable substantive and procedural
rights unavailable in the absence of registration.”).
49.
See 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 26:2 (5th ed. 2017).
50.
See Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1328.
51.
See id. at 1328; Burger King of Fla., Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904, 908
(“Congress expanded the common law, however, by granting an exclusive right
in commerce to federal registrants in areas where there has been no offsetting
use of the mark.”); see also Lanham Act §§ 22, 33, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1115
(2012).
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grants mark-holders a critical substantive right, not available
outside of the Lanham Act, by expanding the geographic scope of
the owner’s exclusive rights to use the trademark.52
A number of procedural benefits also follow from federal
registration of a mark. A federally registered mark is “presumed to
be valid” in any federal trademark litigation.53 “[T]he mark
becomes incontestable (with certain exceptions) after five years of
consecutive post-registration use . . . .”54 The holder of a registered
mark “may sue in federal court to enforce his trademark,”55 and
“may recover treble damages if he can show infringement was
willful.”56 The owner of a registered mark “may also obtain the
assistance of U.S. Customs and Border Protection in restricting
importation of infringing or counterfeit goods,”57 and qualifies “for
a simplified process for obtaining recognition and protection of his
mark in countries that have signed the Paris Convention . . . .”58
“Lastly, registration operates as a complete defense to state or
common law claims of trademark dilution.”59
52.
See Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1328. Oddly, this key
substantive benefit from federal registration is not mentioned in any of the
Supreme Court opinions in Tam. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
53.
Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1328–29 (citing Lanham Act
§ 7(b)).
54.
Id. at 1329 (citing Lanham Act § 15); see also B & B Hardware, Inc.
v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1310 (2015) (“Incontestability is a
powerful protection.”).
55.
Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1329 (citing Lanham Act § 39).
56.
Id. (citing Lanham Act § 35).
57.
Id. (citing Lanham Act § 42).
58.
Id. (citing Lanham Act § 62; Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, art. 6 quinquies, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828
U.N.T.S. 305).
59.
Id. (citing Lanham Act § 43(c)(6)). Moreover, so long as Section 2(a)
stands, the value of state law protections for an unregistrable mark such as
“The Slants” should not be overstated. It is true that state trademark rights
co-exist with the Lanham Act, and can provide a separate source of legal
protection for trademarks generally. But the Federal Circuit has observed that
“[w]hether a user of an unregistrable, disparaging mark has any enforceable
common law rights is at best unclear.” Id. at 1344. The Federal Circuit has
emphasized, similarly, that most states have adopted trademark registration
statutes modelled on the Lanham Act, including its bar on registration of
“disparaging” trademarks. See id. at 1343–44 (noting that the Model State
Trademark Act, which includes a disparagement provision based on the
Lanham Act’s Section 2(a), has been adopted by “virtually all states”). The
Federal Circuit also raised questions as to whether the Lanham Act’s federal
cause of action for unregistered marks could be utilized by a trademark holder
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As this makes clear, the benefits that flow from federal
trademark registration are invaluable. Conversely, as recognized
by the Federal Circuit, “[d]enial of these benefits creates a serious
disincentive to adopt a mark which the government may deem
offensive or disparaging.”60 These realities about trademark law
underscore the wisdom of the Federal Circuit in rejecting the view
that Section 2(a) does not implicate any free speech rights because
the trademark owner can still use the trademark.61 The benefits
attendant to federal registration are extremely valuable, and, as
the Supreme Court recognized, the denial of these benefits to an
otherwise qualifying trademark creates a burden on speech
sufficient to support a free-speech claim.62
C. The Trademark Registry is a Regulation of Commerce
The final point about trademark registration, which can be
obscured by focusing too narrowly on Section 2(a)’s
“disparagement” clause, is that this provision is a small part of a
larger federal regulatory program designed to regulate the use of
marks in the commercial marketplace.63 In deciding how to
characterize trademarks—and whether they should be treated as
commercial speech—it is important to understand this broader
context.
Congress had two purposes in creating a federal registry for
trademarks in the Lanham Act. First, the Act was intended to
“protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a
product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows,
it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get.”64 Second,
the Lanham Act was enacted to ensure that a trademark owner
whose mark was rejected from registration because it “disparaged” a particular
ethnic group. See id. at 1344–45 n.11.
60.
Id. at 1341.
61.
Id. at 1345.
62.
See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1753 (2017) (noting that federal
registration “confers important legal rights and benefits on trademark owners
who register their marks”).
63.
See, e.g., Tam Panel Decision, 785 F.3d 567, 581 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(explaining that “the trademark registration scheme is a prototypical example
of a regulatory regime”).
64.
Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1328 (quoting Two Pesos, Inc. v.
Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 782 n.15 (1992) (quoting S. REP. NO. 791333,
at 3 (1946))).
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“can protect his ‘investment from . . . misappropriation by pirates
and cheats.”65
As the legislative history makes clear, both statutory goals
behind the Lanham Act’s trademark registration scheme were
market-oriented, with one goal focused on supporting consumer
choice, and the other on protecting trademark owners’
investments.66 This dual focus is not surprising, given that the
Lanham Act was enacted under the congressional authority
granted by the Commerce Clause,67 and was consciously intended
to help protect the “free flow of commerce.”68
This point is important for free speech purposes because it ties
directly to the debate in Matal v. Tam over free speech rights in the
context of commercial speech. While Simon Tam expressed a wish
to make a political statement with his choice of “The Slants” as his
band name,69 the registration of that name as a trademark has a
different function.
To be eligible for federal registration, a trademark must be a
brand name, and not simply a political statement.70 A message on
a bumper sticker would not, for example, be a “trademark” that
could be registered.71 Instead, the trademark would have to be the
65.
Id. (quoting Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 782 n.15 (quoting S. REP. NO.
791333, at 3 (1946))); see also Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S.
844, 854–56 n.14 (1982) (“By applying a trademark to goods produced by one
other than the trademark’s owner, the infringer deprives the owner of the
goodwill which he spent energy, time, and money to obtain . . . [a]t the same
time, the infringer deprives consumers of their ability to distinguish among the
goods of competing manufacturers.”).
66.
See, e.g., Park’n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198
(1985) (“The Lanham Act provides national protection of trademarks in order
to secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and to protect
the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers.”).
67.
See, e.g., Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1354 (emphasizing that
“the Lanham Act derives from the Commerce Clause”).
68.
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1752 (2017).
69.
See, e.g., Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1328 (“Mr. Simon Shiao
Tam named his band THE SLANTS to make a statement about racial and
cultural issues in this country.”). Interestingly, in the administrative
proceeding before the USPTO, Mr. Tam denied any intent to express a political
view, and took the position that “the mark does not refer to people of Asian
descent.” Tam Panel Decision, 785 F.3d 567, 570 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
70.
See, e.g., In re Thomas J. Hulting d/b/a No More RINOs! Enterprises,
107 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1175, 1177 (T.T.A.B. 2013).
71.
Id. (concluding that the trademark registration should be refused
where applicant’s proposed “No More RINOs!” mark on t-shirts and bumper
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brand name under which a particular line of bumper stickers is
sold. Mr. Tam may have had politics in mind when choosing his
band name, but federal trademark registration would not be
available at all if he were simply seeking to make a political
statement.
In short, while there is a political component to the band’s
name, Mr. Tam did not bring suit here objecting to the denial of a
permit for his band to play in a public park because of their
message, or raising another traditional free speech issue.72
Instead, this case involved his wish to register “The Slants” as a
federal trademark for his band.73 This presents more complex
constitutional questions, not because it makes Section 2(a) any
more appropriate as a government regulation, but because the issue
arises in the context of a broad federal trademark scheme designed
to regulate commercial activity.
*****

With these basic trademark principles in mind, a better
understanding of the Supreme Court’s decision in Matal v. Tam
should be possible. We turn, first, to the areas in which the Court
agreed on the application of free speech principles.
II. AREAS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT IN MATAL V. TAM

With the Federal Circuit’s change of constitutional course in In
re Tam,74 the stage was set for the Supreme Court to decide
whether to take up the issue. The Federal Circuit’s ruling striking
down Section 2(a)’s disparagement clause on free speech grounds
created a circuit split, if a technical one, with the Fifth Circuit.75
stickers, signifying “No Republicans In Name Only,” “conveys a political slogan
devoid of sourceidentifying [sic] significance and therefore fails to function as
a trademark.”).
72.
See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751.
73.
Id.
74. Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d 1321, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
75.
See Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 578 n.9
(5th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the trademark applicant’s argument “that prohibiting
him from registering a mark with the PTO violates his first amendment rights”
(citing In re Mavety Media Grp., 33 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). This is
more of a “technical” split because the Fifth Circuit’s decision did not contain
any significant discussion of the First Amendment issue, but simply followed
the earlier Federal Circuit position in In re McGinley on the constitutionality
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Moreover, another case involving the same issue was
proceeding through the federal court system at the same time as
“The Slants” litigation, this one involving the trademarked team
name of the Washington Redskins professional football team.76
The Washington Redskins had faced a number of legal challenges
seeking to cancel their trademark registration for the “Redskins.”77
After successfully defeating such challenges over a two-decade
period, the Redskins suffered a serious legal setback in 2014, when
the USPTO cancelled the trademark registration for the Redskins
team name on the ground that it was “disparaging” to Native
Americans.78 The team appealed to the federal district court.79 In
another legal setback for the team, the federal district judge first
ruled that “Section 2(a) . . . does not implicate the First
Amendment”80 and, second, affirmed the agency’s finding that the
team name was disparaging.81 The Redskins case was on appeal to
the Fourth Circuit at the very time that the Matal v. Tam case
arrived at the Supreme Court.82
Adding to the likelihood of convincing the Supreme Court to
take the case, the Matal v. Tam case presented alluring and
interesting issues that implicated free speech, civil rights, and
trademark law.83 The particular type of “disparagement” in the
of the “disparagement” clause. See 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
76.
See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va.
2015).
77.
See, e.g., id.; Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 62 F. Supp. 3d 498 (E.D.
Va. 2014); Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080
(T.T.A.B. 2014); Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 565 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (cert.
denied); Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 415 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Pro-Football,
Inc. v. Harjo, 567 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2008); Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284
F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003).
78.
See Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080
(T.T.A.B. 2014).
79.
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015),
reversed and remanded by Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 709 Fed. App’x 182
(4th Cir. 2018) (mem) .
80.
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. at 448.
81.
Id. at 490 (affirming the agency’s cancellation of the Redskins
trademark as “disparaging” to Native Americans).
82.
In fact, the Redskins lawyers took the unusual step of seeking
certiorari in the Supreme Court before the Fourth Circuit had ruled, but were
rebuffed by the Court. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017); Pro-Football, Inc.
v. Blackhorse, 137 S. Ct. 44 (2016).
83.
See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751.
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Matal v. Tam case84—disparagement based on animosity to racial
groups—excited public debate, and the basic legal questions
presented were both interesting and challenging. Does the federal
government really have to register trademarks that may contain
vile racial epithets? Do such trademarks even enjoy free speech
protection? And if they do, are there government interests that
justify denying registration to such marks? Civil rights groups
could not imagine that the government had to register such
offensive trademarks. Constitutional scholars, on the other hand,
perceived the case as a clear free speech issue.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and, as noted,
numerous amici filed supporting and opposing briefs. By the time
the Court issued its opinion in June of 2017, the many pages of ink
spilled by the parties and amici in trying to illuminate the Supreme
Court far exceeded the relatively short and splintered opinions
issued by the voting Justices. The common ground among these
opinions is explored more fully below. The points of constitutional
dispute are specifically explored in Part III.
A. The Court’s Unanimous Judgment: Section 2(a) Infringes Free
Speech
Matal v. Tam generated three separate opinions, authored,
respectively, by Justice Alito,85 Justice Kennedy,86 and Justice
Thomas.87 While disagreeing on core aspects of the First
Amendment rationale, all participating Justices agreed on a
bottom-line judgment: “[T]he disparagement clause violates the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”88 Justice Alito

84. Id. at 1753–57.
85.
See id. at 1751. Justice Alito’s opinion was joined in its entirety by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer. Id. Justice Thomas joined all of
Justice Alito’s opinion, except Part II, which addressed an issue of statutory
interpretation that he believed had not been preserved for appeal. Id. at 1769
(Thomas, J., concurring). Parts III-B, III-C, and IV of Justice Alito’s opinion
generated, at most, only four votes, and therefore, represent a plurality
opinion. See id. at 1751.
86.
See id. at 1765 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan joined Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion. Id.
87.
See id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring).
88.
Id. at 1765 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (holding that the
“disparagement clause violates the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment”).
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commanded unanimity in stating the judgment of the Court.
Holistically, the Court concluded that the Free Speech Clause does
not permit the government to refuse registration to “disparaging”
trademarks.89
But while all of the Justices agreed as to how the case should
come out, there was much less agreement as to why it should come
out that way, though there were some areas of common ground.
Justice Alito’s basic description of the facts and summary of the
benefits of trademark registration were joined by all Justices.90
Likewise, all except Justice Thomas joined Justice Alito’s statutory
analysis that the term “disparag[ing] to . . . ‘persons’” was correctly
read, as a matter of statutory interpretation, to authorize the
agency to refuse registration to trademarks disparaging to racial
and ethnic groups.91
Parsing the different opinions in Matal v. Tam, three other
basic areas of common ground emerge with respect to free speech.
The Justices agreed, in sum, that: first, Section 2(a)’s
disparagement clause is a viewpoint-based restriction on speech;92
second, viewpoint-based government burdens on speech
presumptively violate the First Amendment;93 and third, Section
2(a) cannot be saved by classifying registered trademarks as
government speech—which is not subject to viewpoint
discrimination restrictions—since trademarks are clearly
private.94
B. Section 2(a) is a Viewpoint-Based Restriction on Speech
All of the Justices agreed, as noted, that the provision of
Section 2(a), which allowed the government to refuse registration
of a trademark that “disparages” particular persons or groups,

89.
See id. at 1751 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion); see also id. at 1765
(Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring).
90.
See id. at 1751–55 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion) (laying out the basic
framework of trademark law and the sequence of events in the case).
91.
See id. at 1755–57 (rejecting the argument by Tam that the term
“persons” in Section 2(a) means only “natural and juristic” persons and does
not extend to racial or ethnic groups). Justice Thomas did not reach this issue
on the grounds that it was not preserved for appeal. See supra note 85.
92.
See infra Section II.B.
93.
See infra Section II.C.
94.
See infra Section II.D.
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constitutes viewpoint discrimination—a government restriction
that seeks to suppress speech because of its message.95
The government had argued that the statute did not
discriminate based on viewpoint because it treated all
“disparaging” trademarks equally—that is, it applied “equally to
marks that damn Democrats and Republicans, capitalists and
socialists.”96 The Court rightfully rejected this.97 As Justice Alito
observed, “[g]iving offense is a viewpoint.”98 Indeed, the agency’s
record of unequal implementation of Section 2(a) provides ample
proof of this.99
In this case, for example, the agency refused to register “The
Slants” because the agency found the mark “disparaging” to
persons of Asian descent.100 Yet the agency had granted trademark
registration to marks laudatory of the cultural qualities of Asians,
including such marks as “Asian Efficiency” and “Celebrasians.”101
In the same vein, the agency rejected registration for the trademark
“Stop the Islamisation of America” while allowing registration for
the culturally positive trademarks “Think Islam” and “New Islam
Cool.”102 It has likewise denied registration to the derogatory
trademark “Heeb” but allowed registration for “Jewishstar.”103
Allowing trademarks that praise a group, but not those that
disparage the same group, clearly constitutes viewpoint
discrimination. A compelling example was provided by Justice
Kennedy’s observation that, under the government’s logic, “a law
would be viewpoint neutral even if it provided that public officials
could be praised but not condemned.”104 Such provisions strike at
the heart of the free speech guarantee.

95.
See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion).
96.
Id.; see also id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“To prohibit all sides
from criticizing their opponents makes a law more viewpoint based, not less
so.”).
97.
See id. at 1763 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion).
98. Id. at 1763.
99. See id. at 1756–57 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion).
100. Id. at 1754.
101. Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d 1321, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
102. Id. at 1336–37.
103. Id.
104. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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C. Viewpoint-Based Restrictions on Speech Violate the First
Amendment
All of the Justices agreed, as well, that viewpoint
discrimination is a particularly pernicious type of government
regulation of speech that is presumptively unconstitutional under
the Free Speech Clause.105 The opinions of both Justice Alito and
Justice Kennedy are on unshakable constitutional ground in these
conclusions.106 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that when
the government targets not subject matter, but the “particular
views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First
Amendment is all the more blatant.”107
Justice Alito’s opinion is replete with emphatic statements to
this effect.108 It is, he says, a “bedrock First Amendment principle”
that speech “may not be banned on the ground that it expresses
ideas that offend.”109 The Supreme Court, he notes, has said “time
and again that ‘the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited
merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their
hearers.’”110 Likewise, the “First Amendment forbids the
government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints
or ideas at the expense of others.”111
The plurality opinion of Justice Kennedy makes the same point
in terms that are only slightly more qualified.112 With narrow
exceptions, he notes, it is a “fundamental principle” of the First
Amendment that “the government may not punish or suppress
speech based on disapproval of the ideas or perspectives the speech
conveys.”113 Viewpoint-based discrimination is “a form of speech
105. Id.
106. See id. at 1763, 1766 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion).
107. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829
(1995).
108. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751, 1757 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion); id. at
1763 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion).
109. Id. at 1751 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion).
110. Id. at 1763 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (quoting Street v. New York,
394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)).
111. Id. at 1757 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion) (quoting Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993)).
112. See id. at 1765–66 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 1765 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
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suppression so potent that it must be subject to rigorous
constitutional scrutiny.”114 A law that is found to discriminate
based on viewpoint is an “egregious” form of content discrimination
that is “presumptively unconstitutional.”115
The Justices agreed, as well, that it is of no constitutional
significance that, under Section 2(a), registration is denied not
because the government disapproves of the message expressed by
the trademark, but because other citizens are offended.116 As
Justice Kennedy emphasized, “[t]he Government may not insulate
a law from charges of viewpoint discrimination by tying censorship
to the reaction of the speaker’s audience.”117 Rather, the
government engages in unlawful suppression of speech when it
allows the opposition of other citizens to be used as a justification
for banning or burdening speech. The government could not, for
example, deny a permit for a parade by unpopular speakers on the
ground that the parade will create a safety hazard by drawing
crowds hostile to the speakers’ message.118 The Court’s precedents,
in Justice Kennedy’s words, have “long prohibited the government
from justifying a First Amendment burden by pointing to the
offensiveness of the speech to be suppressed.”119
That the Justices would agree on these points is scarcely
surprising, given that viewpoint-based government restrictions on
speech go to the heart of the First Amendment’s basic purpose. It
is a constitutional fundamental that the First Amendment “was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas” in public

U.S. 819, 828–29 (1995)).
114. Id.
115. Id. (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2230 (2015)).
116. Id. at 1763 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (emphasizing that the
government may not prohibit “the public expression of ideas . . . merely
because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers” (quoting
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)).
117. Id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 1767 (“[A] speech
burden based on audience reactions is simply government hostility and
intervention in a different guise.”).
118. See, e.g., Forsyth Cty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123,
134–35 (1992) (finding parade regulations that conditioned permit fees on
anticipated crowds a content-based restriction on speech: “Speech cannot be
financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned, simply
because it might offend a hostile mob.”).
119. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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debate.120 That guarantee is gravely threatened whenever the
government is allowed to censor or discourage the expression of
particular viewpoints in that debate.121
D. Trademarks are Private Speech, Not Government Speech
Finally, all of the Justices also agreed that the key
circumstance in which viewpoint discrimination is permissible is
not present here—where the speech at issue constitutes
government or government-sponsored speech instead of speech by
a private citizen.122 It is well-established that “[t]he Free Speech
Clause . . . does not regulate government speech.”123 First
Amendment law recognizes, sensibly, that when the government
itself speaks, it may selectively choose its message without running
afoul of the constitutional bar on viewpoint discrimination.124
The government may, and should, engage in speech that
expresses a specific viewpoint. Indeed, this is essential to
governing. Justice Alito gave a simple example: When the
government, in World War II, produced and distributed millions of
posters to support the war effort by urging citizens to enlist, buy
war bonds, and save scarce resources, “the First Amendment did
not demand that the Government balance the message” by
producing posters urging citizens not to enlist and not to support
the war effort.125 More broadly, the government necessarily
endorses a particular viewpoint whenever it launches a policy
initiative, proposes a regulation, submits legislation to Congress,
issues an Executive order, or takes any of the many actions involved
in the process of governing.126
120. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548 (2001) (quoting
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)).
121. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 829 (1995) (noting that government discrimination against speech based
on the “opinion or perspective of the speaker” is a “more blatant” and
“egregious form of content discrimination”); see also Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
135 S. Ct. 2218, 2230 (2015) (to same effect).
122. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1765 (Kennedy., J. concurring); id. at 1769
(Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 1758, 1760 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion).
123. Id. at 1757 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion) (quoting Pleasant Grove City
v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1758.
126. See, e.g., id. at 1757 (“When a government entity embarks on a course
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At times, in a case that ostensibly implicates private speech,
one side will argue that the message of a private speaker should
instead be treated as government speech because the government
has adopted or endorsed that message. The determinative
constitutional question then becomes whether to classify the
expression at issue as government speech or private speech. By
labelling a particular mode of expression as government speech, the
Supreme Court has at times been able to sidestep addressing the
merits of a Free Speech challenge.127 But these “government
speech” cases are challenging to summarize, and tend to present
idiosyncratic fact patterns.
It is established, for example, that the government may adopt
or endorse private speech to express its own message.128 The
government may also speak by “recruiting others to communicate a
message on its behalf.”129 In such instances, the speech will be
treated as the government’s own statement. The Supreme Court
has emphasized, in this regard, that the government “is entitled to
say what it wishes” when it uses private speakers to transmit
specific information pertaining to a government program.130
The Court has shown some inclination in recent years to
expand its “government speech” doctrine,131 and the rationale has
of action, it necessarily takes a particular viewpoint and rejects others.”);
Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246
(2015) (“[A]s a general matter, when the government speaks it is entitled to
promote a program, to espouse a policy, or to take a position.”).
127. See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005)
(concluding that, in constitutional challenge to government-funded advertising
for the beef industry, “the dispositive question is whether the generic
advertising at issue is the Government’s own speech and therefore is exempt
from First Amendment scrutiny”).
128. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472
(2009) (holding that when the City accepted donated monuments to erect in a
public park, it was engaged in government speech and did not create a public
forum open to other private monuments).
129. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1768 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing case
law).
130. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833
(1995) (describing the Court’s holding in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184–
87 (1991), which upheld the constitutionality of a provision that banned groups
receiving federal funding for a family planning program from discussing
abortion with their clients in the program).
131. Compare Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562 (treating as government speech a
generic advertising campaign promoting the beef industry financed under a
federal program), with United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409–
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been increasingly invoked by litigants in free speech challenges.132
At the same time, all voting Justices in Matal v. Tam recognized
the danger of applying the Court’s “government speech” precedents
too broadly.133
The question here, in essence, was whether registering
trademarks in an official federal registry gives such trademarks the
imprimatur of government approval, so as to turn them into a type
of “government speech.”134 The Justices unanimously answered
this question “no.”135 Applying the “government speech”
precedents in the trademark context, the Court concluded that
merely registering a private trademark does not turn that mark
into “government speech.”136 As Justice Alito emphasized, the
government does not endorse the message of any given trademark
by placing it on the federal trademark register.137
This is clearly correct. Registration simply acts as notice to the
public that the trademark has met certain legal requirements as a
source-identifier for the trademark owner’s goods or services and is
owned by a particular company. The USPTO, the government
agency charged with the trademark registration process, has
expressly stated that the issuance of a trademark registration “is
not a government imprimatur.”138
The “government speech” precedent most heavily relied upon
by the government here was the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans,139
17 (2001) (treating as private speech a generic advertising campaign promoting
the mushroom industry financed under a similar government program).
132. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1757 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion).
133. Id. at 1758 (“[W]e must exercise great caution before extending our
government-speech precedents.”); id. at 1768 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(emphasizing that the government-speech exception is “narrow, to prevent the
government from claiming that every government program is exempt from the
First Amendment”).
134. Id. at 1757 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion).
135. Id. at 1759; id. at 1765 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1769 (Thomas,
J., concurring).
136. Id. at 1758–60 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion).
137. See id. at 1758 (noting that the trademark examiner “does not inquire
whether any viewpoint conveyed by a mark is consistent with Government
policy”).
138. In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216, 1220 n.3
(T.T.A.B. 1993); see also Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1759 (“The PTO has made it clear
that registration does not constitute approval of a mark.”).
139. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1760.
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upholding a Texas law that allows the State broad discretion as to
when to issue “specialty license plates” that include a private
group’s message in addition to the usual contents of the license
plate, such as the plate number and State.140 The law gave Texas
officials broad power to grant or deny private petitions proposing
specialty license plates, including the power to reject a petition if
the proposed design “might be offensive to any member of the
public.”141
Notwithstanding the inclusion of a private group’s message,
the Supreme Court held in Walker that the specialty license plates
were government speech.142 The private designs accepted by the
State were placed on “government-mandated, governmentcontrolled, and government-issued” vehicle identification plates
and were “meant to convey and have the effect of conveying a
government message.”143 Because the Court found that the case
involved government speech, Texas could properly decide to
endorse some groups’ messages and to decline to endorse other
messages that could be “offensive.”144
The Court in Matal v. Tam had little difficulty distinguishing
the Walker precedent.145 Justice Alito found it “far-fetched” in the
context of the federal trademark registration scheme to “suggest
that the content of a registered mark is government speech.”146 If
a registered trademark is government speech, he observed, one
would be forced to conclude that the federal government is
“babbling prodigiously and incoherently,” saying “many unseemly
things,” expressing “contradictory views,” and “unashamedly
140.
Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2239, 2244–45 (2015) (regarding Texas’s rejection of a proposed license plate
design that would have included the confederate flag and the words “Sons of
Confederate Veterans” and providing other examples of approved specialty
license plates including: the Florida Gators sports team’s logo and the
statement “The Gator Nation,” and the Rotary International logo and the
words, “SERVICE ABOVE SELF”).
141.
Id.
142. Id. at 2246.
143. Id. at 2250.
144. See id. at 2246 (emphasizing that “as a general matter, when the
government speaks it is entitled to promote a program, to espouse a policy, or
to take a position”).
145. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760 (2017).
146. Id. at 1759 (“None of our government speech cases even remotely
supports the idea that registered trademarks are government speech.”).
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endorsing a vast array of commercial products and services.”147 As
Justice Alito bluntly summed up, “[t]rademarks are private, not
government, speech.”148
Looking to the federal trademark scheme, this was clearly the
only defensible conclusion.149 When the government accepts Nike’s
trademarked slogan for trademark registration, the government is
obviously not trying to adopt that slogan and tell American citizens
to “Just do it.”150 Instead, federal registration simply serves as
nationwide notice to the public and competing businesses that
Nike—a private company—has properly staked out that slogan as
a mark for sales of its own commercial line of sports products.151
In short, the Court recognized in Matal v. Tam that a
trademark is private speech before it is registered, and the fact that
it has been included in a government database does not change that
conclusion.152 Under the government’s proposed rationale, Justice
Alito emphasized, any copyrighted book or article would be stripped
of constitutional free speech protections whenever its author took
steps to protect his copyright by federally registering the work.153
Moreover, there are a plethora of government registration
schemes.154 Thus, to hold that a program for governmental
147. Id. at 1758.
148. Id. at 1760.
149. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2002).
150. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1759 (posing the question, “if trademarks represent
government speech, what does the Government have in mind when it advises
Americans to ‘make.believe’ (Sony), ’Think different’ (Apple), ’Just do it’
(Nike), or ‘Have it your way’ (Burger King)? Was the Government warning
about a coming disaster when it registered the mark ‘EndTime Ministries’?”
(footnotes omitted)).
151. Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d 1321, 1346–47 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(noting that “the PTO routinely registers marks that no one can say the
government endorses, [such as] RADICALLY FOLLOWING CHRIST IN
MISSION TOGETHER, . . . THINK ISLAM, . . . GANJA UNIVERSITY, . . .
CAPITALISM SUCKS DONKEY BALLS, . . . TAKE YO PANTIES OFF, . . .
and MURDER 4 HIRE . . . .” (citations omitted)).
152.
Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1760 (“Trademarks are private, not government,
speech.”).
153.
See id. at 1760 (“If federal registration makes a trademark
government speech and thus eliminates all First Amendment protection,
would the registration of the copyright for a book produce a similar
transformation?”).
154.
See id. at 1761 (“Trademark registration is not the only government
registration scheme. For example, the Federal Government registers
copyrights and patents. State governments and their subdivisions register the
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registration turns a private party’s speech into government speech
would give the government, Justice Alito emphasized, sweeping
powers to “silence or muffle the expression of disfavored
viewpoints.”155
While it may resonate emotionally to argue that the
government should not have to accept offensive and racially
derogatory trademarks and slogans for federal registration, the
Court was correct in its conclusion that the government is not
“speaking” or endorsing the messages expressed by offensive
trademarks merely by accepting those trademarks for
registration.156
From the discussion above, it might seem that the Court was
in broad agreement as to the constitutional free speech issue
presented by Matal v. Tam, but the remainder of the opinions belie
this impression. When it came to the final step of the free speech
analysis—scrutinizing the reasons offered by the government to
support the speech restriction—the Court lost their consensus.157
III. AREAS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DISPUTE IN MATAL V. TAM

Oddly, although all voting Justices found that Section 2(a)’s
“disparagement” provision violated the Free Speech Clause, the
Court could not agree on the proper constitutional analysis. While
all Justices agreed that the law was a viewpoint-based restriction
on private speech, the Justices could not reach agreement on
another free speech issue: should the restriction on trademarks at
issue here be analyzed as a government regulation of commercial
speech? Or as a government burden on core political speech?158
The answer to this question dictates how much deference the court
will give to the governmental restriction on speech.
The parties were in pointed disagreement as to the proper level
title to real property and security interests; they issue driver’s licenses, motor
vehicle registrations, and hunting, fishing, and boating licenses or permits.”).
155. Id. at 1758.
156. Id. at 1760 (“Holding that the registration of a trademark converts the
mark into government speech would constitute a huge and dangerous
extension of the government-speech doctrine.”).
157. Id. at 1760–61, 1763, 1766.
158.
See id. at 1763–64 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (noting that “we must
confront a dispute between the parties on the question whether trademarks
are commercial speech and are thus subject to the relaxed scrutiny outlined in
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.” (citation omitted)).
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of scrutiny.159 The government took the position that “all
trademarks are commercial speech,” arguing for a deferential
standard of review.160 Conversely, Mr. Tam took the position that
“many, if not all, trademarks have an expressive component,”
arguing that stricter scrutiny of the government’s action was
required.161 Matal v. Tam did not prove to be a useful vehicle for
reaching a thoughtful resolution of this issue.
Ultimately, four Justices concluded that “we need not resolve”
this dispute, because the restriction at issue fails even under the
more lenient standard of review for restrictions on commercial
speech.162 But four Justices insisted, to the contrary, that even if
trademarks are commercial speech, “the viewpoint based
discrimination at issue here necessarily invokes heightened
scrutiny.”163 In failing to reach any common ground on the
appropriate degree of scrutiny, Matal v. Tam highlights a key area
of dispute under the First Amendment: the extent to which
commercial speech should enjoy free speech protection, and under
what constitutional test such challenges should be decided. In this
sense, Matal v. Tam lies at the cusp of a fundamental but difficult
constitutional dispute that has been brewing for some time. While
the contours of free speech law applied to traditional, “core” political
speech are relatively well-settled, the Supreme Court’s more recent
extension of free speech rights to commercial speech has created
confusion over the proper scope of this more controversial doctrine,
as explained further below.

159.
Id.
160. Id. at 1764.
161. Id.
162. Id.; see also id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that he is
joining this aspect of Justice Alito’s opinion because “it correctly concludes that
the disparagement clause . . . is unconstitutional even under the less stringent
test announced in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.” (citations omitted)).
163. Id. at 1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Interestingly, while joining
Justice Alito’s decision, Justice Thomas also noted his belief that “when the
government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to suppress the ideas it
conveys, strict scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech in question
may be characterized as ‘commercial.’” See id. at 1768 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)). Arguably, therefore, a majority of Justices agreed that “strict
scrutiny” should be applied here.
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A. The (Relatively) Clear Contours of Traditional Free Speech
Doctrine
The traditional arena of free speech cases—marches, public
protests, political speeches, and the like—had led to a relatively
clear and stable understanding of free speech principles among the
courts, one that resonated with the courts’ inherent sense of the
fundamental purposes of the Free Speech clause.164
Consider, for example, the long-established rules on speech in
a traditional public forum (a street, park, or the like). Where the
government imposes content-based restrictions on speech in a
traditional public forum—for example, if the government were to
announce that a public park open for private displays generally will
be closed to private religious displays—the courts will apply “strict
scrutiny.”165 This means that the courts will uphold such a contentbased restriction only if it is “necessary to serve a compelling state
interest” and “narrowly drawn to achieve that end” (a notoriously
difficult standard to meet).166 Such actions are closely reviewed
because the government is prohibited from censoring particular
topics for public debate.
If the government goes further and bars speech based on
viewpoint—for example, if the government ban on displays in the
private park, posited above, did not extend to all religious displays,
but only to displays promoting atheism—the review is further
heightened. In the example above, a sign condemning atheists
would be permitted, but a sign advocating for atheism would not.
This constitutes viewpoint discrimination. When the government
imposes a viewpoint-based restriction on private speech, it is
treated as an “egregious” form of content-based regulation of

164. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980) (noting that publicissue picketing is “an exercise of . . . basic constitutional rights in their most
pristine and classic form” and “has always rested on the highest rung of the
hierarchy of First Amendment values” (citations omitted)).
165. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753, 761 (1995) (emphasizing that “strict standards” apply when the
government seeks to regulate expressive content in a traditional public forum).
166. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981); see also, e.g., Capitol
Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. at 761 (noting similarly that the
government may regulate expressive content in a traditional public forum
“only if such a restriction is necessary, and narrowly drawn, to serve a
compelling state interest”).
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speech, and is reviewed even more strictly.167 Government
restrictions based on the viewpoint expressed by a private speaker
are presumptively unconstitutional.168
On the other hand, even in a traditional public forum such as
a park, the government is well within its rights to enact reasonable
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions.169 Such rules
command deference, and will be upheld so long as they are truly
“content-neutral,” are “narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest,” and “leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information.”170
In these traditional free speech cases, the courts had also
developed an orderly set of free speech principles for assessing
speech-related regulations in forums that were not traditionally
used for speech, but had been set aside by the government for that
purpose (“limited public forums”) and on government property more
generally (“nonpublic forums”).171 This relatively stable set of
traditional free speech rules was unsettled by a legal movement
that decisively emerged around 1980, the year in which the
Supreme Court first established a general free speech test
applicable to attempts to limit commercial speech, the Central
Hudson Gas test.172 The introduction of free speech protections for
commercial speech threw a wrench in the works of this relatively
orderly and clear system of constitutional free speech analysis.

167. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 829 (1995) (“Viewpoint discrimination is . . . an egregious form of content
discrimination.”).
168. See, e.g., id. at 829 (“The government must abstain from regulating
speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of
the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”).
169. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. at 761
(noting that the government may impose reasonable, content-neutral, time,
place, and manner restrictions on speech in traditional public forum).
170. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
171. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S.
37, 45–46 (1983) (describing the rules applicable to different types of forums).
172. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
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B. The Slow Development of Commercial Free Speech Rights
For many years, commercial speech was considered to lie
“outside the ambit of the First Amendment,”173 and thus not
entitled to any constitutional protection under the Free Speech
clause. It was not until the mid-1970’s that the Supreme Court held
that the First Amendment protected the dissemination of truthful
and non-misleading commercial messages about lawful products
and services.174 And, as noted, it was not until 1980 that the
Supreme Court established a specific constitutional doctrine for
assessing the free speech rights for commercial speech.175
In the Central Hudson Gas case,176 the Supreme Court
articulated its “commercial speech” doctrine. The State of New
York had sought to bar any promotional advertising by an electric
utility, and the Supreme Court invalidated this bar on free speech
grounds.177 Recognizing that there is a “‘commonsense’ distinction
between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs
in an area traditionally subject to government regulation,” and
other types of speech,178 the Court held that the Constitution
protects commercial speech but “accords a lesser protection to
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed
expression.”179 The Court went on to lay out a four-part test for
determining the constitutionality of restrictions on commercial
speech that still governs this area of doctrine today.180

173. Tam Panel Decision, 785 F.3d 567, 574–75 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
174.
See generally Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti–History and
Pre–History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747, 754–55 (1993); see 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 496 (1996) (describing the
evolution of commercial speech doctrine).
175.
See Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 566.
176.
Id.
177. Id. at 558–59, 570.
178. Id. at 562.
179. Id. at 563.
180.
Id. at 566 (“In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has
developed. At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next,
we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”).
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The Central Hudson Gas formula,181 which has been applied
in cases too numerous to list, has come to be known as the
“intermediate scrutiny” test for commercial speech. In applying
“intermediate scrutiny,” the courts emphasize that while
commercial speech enjoys certain constitutional protections, the
leeway for government regulation remains greater in the areas of
commercial speech than for other forms of expression.182 For
example, content-based limitations on commercial speech, which
would be subject to “strict scrutiny” review in other contexts,183
may be often permissible when the government is regulating
commercial speech.
A government regulation applicable to commercial speech
could properly, for example, explicitly target only advertising that
markets banking services (a content-based limitation of commercial
speech) yet still pass muster under the First Amendment.184 By
contrast, a government regulation that excluded from a traditional
public forum any political speech discussing banking would quickly
invoke strict scrutiny.185
The development of commercial speech doctrine threw a
wrench in the works, to begin with, because the proponents of the
right depart quite significantly from what the courts have thought
of as the “core” of free speech. The traditional free speech plaintiff
that comes to mind is a political protestor, not a wealthy
corporation.

181.
Id.
182.
See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)
(noting that the Court has “afforded commercial speech a limited measure of
protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be
impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.”).
183.
See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813
(2000) (noting that a content-based speech restriction “can stand only if it
satisfies strict scrutiny”).
184.
See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 579 (2011) (noting
that “a State may choose to regulate price advertising in one industry but not
in others, because the risk of fraud . . . is in its view greater there.” (citation
omitted)).
185.
See, e.g., Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456 (noting that the Court has “afforded
commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing
modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of
noncommercial expression.”).

152 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:122
Even more important, if free speech rights are extended to
encompass commercial speech, there are many regulatory schemes
that touch on speech but have never been thought of as raising any
First Amendment issues that must now be considered. Recognizing
free speech protections for “commercial” speech runs head on into
the power of Congress to “regulate commerce,” a power that
supports the enactment of numerous federal regulatory schemes.186
Many of these directly or indirectly regulate speech activities.
The challenge is how to recognize appropriate speech rights in
the commercial arena without compromising the federal
government’s ability to regulate commerce and state governments’
ability to protect public health, safety and welfare. Read too
broadly, commercial free speech rights will hamper the
government’s ability to engage in regulation in the public interest
and encourage legal challenges by regulated industries whenever a
regulatory regime threatens to affect speech activities (as is
virtually always the case, given the breadth with which “speech” is
defined).
It is also notoriously difficult to distinguish “commercial
speech” from non-commercial speech. The relatively narrow
definition used by the Supreme Court in some of its initial cases
defined commercial speech cases as speech “that proposes a
commercial transaction.”187 In the Central Hudson Gas case,
however, the Court more broadly referred to commercial speech as
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker
and its audience.”188 Moreover, even within the narrower category
of speech “proposing a commercial transaction,” such speech often
includes both commercial and expressive components.189 How
should the courts, for example, evaluate a government ban on the
distribution of pamphlets by commercial companies that operates
to bar the distribution of pamphlets that both advertise a particular
186.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
187.
See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,
421 (1993) (explaining that the Court’s early commercial speech cases stand
for the proposition that “even speech that does no more than propose a
commercial transaction is protected by the First Amendment” (citations
omitted)); see also, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
188.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
189. Id. at 561–62.
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company’s prophylactics and inform the public of the hazards of
sexually-transmitted disease? Should this be treated as a
restriction on commercial speech or on core political speech?
The debate has tended to devolve into extended debates—as
here—on which standard of “scrutiny” should be applied, and which
type of speech is at issue, commercial speech or “core” speech.
While this may seem technical, the level of scrutiny can be
determinative in a First Amendment challenge. There is a common
saying—“strict in theory, fatal in fact”—that many argue is an apt
description of the “strict scrutiny” standard.190
Few government actions reviewed under “strict scrutiny” can
provide a justification sufficient to support the restriction on
speech. Conversely, the “intermediate scrutiny” test gives far more
respect to and leeway for government action in a particular
regulatory sphere. In simple terms, while strict scrutiny looks with
suspicion on the government’s actions, intermediate scrutiny gives
the government the benefit of the doubt. Which standard of
scrutiny to apply to commercial speech in different settings is a
matter of hot debate in the Supreme Court’s recent decisions.191
C. Symptoms of the Commercial Speech Debate in Matal v. Tam
This simmering debate over commercial speech explains the
doctrinal disputes that led the Court in Matal v. Tam to splinter
over the final step that was needed to reach a unanimous rationale
(and not simply a unanimous judgment), on the free speech issue
presented192—the proper level of scrutiny here.
When Justice Alito turned to the issue, he framed the “debate”
between the parties as “whether trademarks are commercial
speech” and thus, subject to the “relaxed scrutiny” outlined in

190.
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)
(making reference to the notion that “strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory,
but fatal in fact’” while seeking to dispel it).
191.
See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 579 (2011) (dispute
between majority and dissent over whether strict scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny, or rational basis scrutiny applies in free speech challenge to state law
barring the disclosure of physician’s drug prescribing data for “marketing”
purposes).
192. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763–64 (2017) (Alito, J.) (plurality
opinion).
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Central Hudson Gas.193 Without delving into the merits of the
parties’ arguments, he simply noted that “we need not resolve this
debate” because the disparagement clause “cannot withstand even
Central Hudson review.”194 Justice Alito was joined in this
conclusion by three other Justices (Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Breyer, and Justice Thomas).195
Justice Kennedy fundamentally disagreed that the legal issue
was open.196 Instead, he insisted, the Court has already decided
this very issue.197 According to Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor, the Supreme Court held two
years ago, in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., that “commercial speech
is no exception” to the principle that the First Amendment “requires
heightened scrutiny whenever the government creates a regulation
of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”198
Meanwhile, in the third opinion in Matal v. Tam, Justice Thomas
joined that part of Justice Alito’s opinion, concluding that the
Court “need not resolve the debate,” and expressed separately his
agreement with Justice Kennedy on the merits.199
He
“continue[d]” to adhere to his view that that strict scrutiny is
required “when[ever] the government seeks to restrict truthful
speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys,” whether nor not
the speech could be seen as “commercial.”200 (It is possible that
Justice Thomas simply did not agree with that part of Justice
Kennedy’s opinion that insisted that this issue had already been
resolved by the Supreme Court’s Sorrell case.)
And as for the Sorrell201 case? That case can easily be read for
both propositions, since it is highly equivocal on whether or not it
resolved the issue of viewpoint discrimination directed at

193. Id. at 1763. If his statement that “we need not resolve” this dispute
was not noncommittal enough, Justice Alito also expressly emphasizes that his
opinion “leave[s] open the question whether Central Hudson provides the
appropriate test for deciding free speech challenges to provisions of the
Lanham Act.” Id. at 1764 n.17.
194. Id. at 1764.
195. Id. at 1751 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion).
196. Id. at 1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
197. Id.
198. Id. (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011)).
199. Id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring).
200. Id.
201. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 552.
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commercial speech.202 In Sorrell, the Supreme Court considered a
complex state law directed to “data mining” in the pharmaceutical
industry that barred pharmacies from selling information about
physicians’ patterns of prescribing drugs, without their consent, for
marketing purposes.203 While the law barred data sharing with
for-profit drug companies, it included an exception that allowed
data sharing with private and academic researchers.204
The Court held that that law on its face was both “contentbased” (directed at marketing) and “speaker-based” (directed at
drug companies).205 It also held that, “in practice,” the law was
viewpoint-based, since the drug companies barred from getting the
information were all seeking it in order to convince the targeted
doctors to buy their branded drugs.206
In one part of the Sorrell opinion, the Court did state, as Justice
Kennedy invokes, that because the law is “designed to impose a
specific, content-based burden on protected expression,” it “follows
that heightened judicial scrutiny is warranted.”207 In the same
discussion, the Court also said that “[t]he First Amendment
requires heightened scrutiny whenever the government creates ‘a
regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it
conveys,’”208 and that “[c]ommercial speech is no exception.”209 The
Court concluded this discussion by stating that the Vermont law at
issue “imposes a speaker- and content-based burden on protected
expression, and that circumstance is sufficient to justify application
of heightened scrutiny.”210
Confusingly, however, this discussion was immediately
followed by the Court’s statement in Sorrell that there was “no need
202. See id. at 571.
203. Id. at 558–59.
204. Id. at 559–60.
205. Id. at 563–64.
206. Id. at 578–79. By contrast, the law did not bar public interest groups
who wish to contradict the drug companies’ messages from getting the
information. See id. at 564 (noting that it “appears that Vermont could supply
academic organizations with prescriber-identifying information to use in
countering the messages of brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers and in
promoting the prescription of generic drugs.”).
207. Id. at 565.
208. Id. at 566 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1981)).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 571.
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to determine” whether the speech affected by the law is commercial,
since the “outcome is the same” whether strict or intermediate
scrutiny is applied.211 The Court went on to apply the commercial
speech test under Central Hudson Gas, before concluding that the
law failed intermediate scrutiny.212
In addition, while the Court mentioned that the law was “in
practice” viewpoint-based, its express holdings appear to be limited
to the aspects of the law that were content- and speaker-based.213
Thus, this case has been interpreted as leaving open the viewpointdiscrimination issue for which Justice Kennedy cited it.214 While
it is not surprising that the Justices could not agree on the
significance of the Sorrell decision, it is notable that Justice Alito’s
decision does not even respond to Justice Kennedy’s point.215
In short, because the Justices in Matal v. Tam were unable to
agree on the proper treatment of commercial speech in this
context—or to settle on a single standard of scrutiny—the case
produced no single opinion for the Court laying out a clear
constitutional rationale.216
IV. THE MOST COHERENT APPROACH TO FREE SPEECH IN THIS SETTING

This legal background, described above, explains why a case
involving a little-known band and an obscure provision of
trademark law should generate so much interest among amici from
the Chamber of Commerce, to Pro-Football, to the ACLU. Yet,
ultimately, the Supreme Court did not advance the ongoing debate
over commercial speech in any meaningful way in its decision in
211. Id. (noting that the “State argues that a different analysis applies here
because, assuming § 4631(d) burdens speech at all, it at most burdens only
commercial speech. As in previous cases, however, the outcome is the same
whether a special commercial speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial
scrutiny is applied.”).
212. Id. at 572–79.
213.
See id. at 588 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (interpreting the majority
opinion to say “that we must give content-based restrictions that burden
speech ‘heightened’ scrutiny” and that “[c]ommercial speech is no exception”).
214.
See, e.g., Tam Panel Decision, 785 F.3d 567, 582 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(Moore, J., writing specially) (citing Sorrell in noting that “[a]lthough the
Supreme Court has yet to decide whether strict scrutiny attaches to
restrictions on commercial speech that are viewpoint discriminatory, there is
reason to believe it is an issue worth considering.”).
215. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
216. See id.
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Matal v. Tam.217
Stepping back to consider the different opinions in the Matal v.
Tam case from a bird’s-eye view, however, it is puzzling as to why
all of the Justices could not agree on a single opinion for the Court
as a whole. They all agreed on the outcome. They agreed as well
on what might seem to an outsider as the central free speech
principle in this case (viewpoint discrimination by the government
is not allowed by the free speech clause). Why the ongoing
disagreements about commercial speech doctrine would have
prevented a full Court opinion in this particular case is unclear.
The opinions—issued on one of the last days of the Term—seem
cursory.
This raises a legitimate question: Was the Supreme Court so
focused on its ongoing dispute about commercial speech rights that
it missed the opportunity to reach common ground on a more basic,
but fundamental, aspect of First Amendment law? Or was it,
perhaps, waiting for Justice Gorsuch to join the debate in order to
issue a fuller opinion on the commercial speech issue?
Whatever the reason, this was arguably a missed opportunity.
The Court rightly rejected the Federal Circuit’s proposed
constitutional framework. However, this case might well have
presented an opportunity to bring the Court together in a
meaningful and helpful way on the narrow viewpointdiscrimination question posed in Matal v. Tam, a point explored
further below.
A. Rejecting the “Expressive Character” Test was a Valuable
Contribution
The Court was right, first of all, to reject the proposed
framework articulated by the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision.218
If nothing else, the Matal v. Tam decision is valuable in that it
displaces a free speech theory in the commercial speech context that
could have engendered yet more confusion.219
The Federal Circuit en banc held that even within a single
regulatory scheme, a government regulation that targets the
“expressive component” of commercial speech should be judged
217.
218.
219.

See id. at 1764, 1767 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion).
Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d 1321, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1338.
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strictly, while one that regulates the “commercial component” of the
same speech should get more deference.220 Noting that trademarks
have both commercial and expressive aspects, the Federal Circuit
proposed that the standard of scrutiny in a given case should be
based, not on the character of the speech generally, but on “which
aspect of the speech is targeted by the measure being reviewed.”221
Because section 2(a)’s disparagement clause is “entirely directed to
the expressive component of the speech,” the court held, strict
scrutiny should apply.222
The Federal Circuit’s theory attempts to bring clarity to
commercial speech doctrine by proposing that the courts start with
the details of the regulation at issue, rather than by characterizing
the type of speech being regulated.223 It is true that the Central
Hudson Gas test224 is a blunt instrument that is not sufficiently
nuanced for considering the wide variety of free speech issues that
can arise in the regulatory context. At the same time, the
“expressive character” test offered by the Federal Circuit in its en
banc decision in In re Tam225 would have been a dangerous
precedent.
To begin with, the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that section 2(a)
“targets speech that is of ‘public concern’”226 appears to have been
heavily influenced by its factual finding that Simon Tam “named
his band THE SLANTS to make a statement about racial and
cultural issues in this country.”227 This factual finding should not
play any decisive role in dictating the level of constitutional
scrutiny.
Simply as a factual matter, at times in the litigation, Mr. Tam
220. Id.; see also id. (“The disparagement provision must be assessed under
First Amendment standards applicable to what it targets, which is not the
commercial-speech function of the mark.”).
221. Id. at 1339.
222. Id. at 1338, 1339; see also id. (noting that the court is not addressing
“a government regulation aimed at the commercial component of speech”); id.
(“[s]trict scrutiny must apply to a government regulation that is directed at the
expressive component of speech.”).
223. Id. at 1339.
224. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980).
225. Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1338.
226. Id. at 1339.
227. Id. at 1327–28; see, e.g., id. at 1338 (“With his band name, Mr. Tam
makes a statement about racial and ethnic identity.”).
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denied any political motivation in picking “The Slants” as a name
(and indeed, denied that it was a racial slur at all), whether
genuinely or for strategic reasons.228 But even if he had always
insisted that he was politically motivated, the level of constitutional
protection for speech cannot possibly turn on how a speaker chooses
to characterize his own speech. Under this rationale, fast food
restaurants could gain enhanced free speech protections simply by
announcing that they are seeking to send a “political message” by
urging consumers to buy their new bacon cheeseburgers.229 The
emphasis on Tam’s “political message” throughout this litigation is
an appealing detail for free speech purposes but ultimately proves
to be a red herring.
More fundamentally, the concept that regulations can be neatly
divided into two categories, those that target either a “commercial
component” or an “expressive component” of commercial speech, is
flawed. Most advertising, by its nature, is both highly expressive
and commercially motivated. The same is true of trademarks. As
Justice Alito emphasized in Matal v. Tam, “the line between
commercial and non-commercial speech is not always clear.”230
Justice Kennedy observed, in the same vein, that trademarks
“make up part of the expression of everyday life, as with the names
of entertainment groups, broadcast networks, designer clothing,
newspapers, automobiles, candy bars, toys, and so on.”231 It is
illusory to think that it is possible to separate the “expressive” from
the “commercial” aspects of the speech in the manner that the
Federal Circuit’s analysis suggests.232
228. In the administrative proceeding before the USPTO, Mr. Tam denied
any intent to express a political view, and took the position that “the mark does
not refer to people of Asian descent.” Tam Panel Decision, 785 F.3d 567, 570
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
229. It is also notable that the outcome here would have been the same had
Tam denied that the mark was intended to be disparaging rather than
embraced the name as a racial slur, since the Court had ample evidence in the
record that the trademark was seen as disparaging by other Asian-Americans,
which is the relevant test under this particular statutory provision. See, e.g.,
Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1332 (noting that the USPTO disqualified
“The Slants” mark because it “found that the mark is disparaging to a
substantial component of people of Asian descent”).
230. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (Alito, J.) (plurality
opinion).
231. Id. at 1768 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
232. Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1339.
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As important, this expressive aspect of trademark is at the
heart of the trademark registration review in every instance, not
simply when considering section 2(a)’s “disparagement” clause. A
trademark cannot be registered at all unless it is sufficiently
“distinctive,” that is, capable of “distinguishing” the goods or
services from those offered by others in the same market.233 This
requires that the agency look closely, in each case, at the message
a trademark is expressing. To place a particular mark on the socalled “spectrum of distinctiveness,” as the agency does every day,
requires one to consider whether the expressive aspects of this
mark, as used for this product, are sufficiently distinctive to evoke
the product’s source in the eye of the consumer simply from seeing
the mark (for example, consider the expressive quality of Tiffany
blue packaging).234
Thus, while a generic term like “Milk” would clearly not be
sufficiently distinctive to be acceptable as a trademark for dairy
products,235 a trademark like “Smooth and Creamy” might well be.
In deciding whether to grant federal registration for the latter
mark, the agency would necessarily have to look to and assess the
mark’s “expressive” capacity as a trademark for dairy products.
Outside of the trademark area, many, many regulatory
schemes similarly, directly or obliquely touch on the “expressive
component” of particular speech as it may be relevant for the
purpose of that particular regulatory scheme, from the federal
securities laws to food and drug laws. As the Supreme Court has
emphasized, “[b]y definition commercial speech is linked
inextricably to commercial activity . . . .”236 Laws regulating
233. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012) (“No trademark by which the
goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be
refused registration” except on specified and limited grounds.).
234. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992)
(explaining that trademarks “are often classified in categories of generally
increasing distinctiveness; following the classic formulation set out by Judge
Friendly, they may be (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary;
or (5) fanciful.”); see also, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S.
159, 163 (1995) (“[O]ver time, customers may come to treat a particular color
on a product . . . as signifying a brand. And, if so, that color would have come
to identify and distinguish the goods.”).
235. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (trademarks will not be registered if they are
“merely descriptive” of the products).
236. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979) (internal quotations
omitted) (emphasizing that “the State does not lose its power to regulate
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commercial activity routinely require that advertising, labelling,
disclosures, or other speech-related commercial activities either
include or omit particular information in order to protect the
consumer. Because such provisions are an essential and proper
part of regulating commerce, the Supreme Court has expressly held
that for commercial speech, the First Amendment allows “modes of
regulation . . . that might be impermissible in the realm of
noncommercial expression.”237
In short, the proposed test offered by the Federal Circuit— that
whenever a regulation is focused on the “expressive component” of
commercial speech, the court should apply strict scrutiny238—is
seriously overbroad. The problem here was not that the agency
considered the “expressive character” of Mr. Tam’s mark; the
agency routinely and properly considers the messages expressed by
trademarks in making registration determinations. Rather, the
problem is that section 2(a)’s “disparagement” provision allows the
government to reject otherwise qualifying trademarks based on
their viewpoint.239 It is this flaw that should and must be the focus
of any free speech test in this context.
B. The Free Speech Analysis That Should Have Worked for the
Full Court
Focusing on the issue of viewpoint discrimination, there is a
great deal of common ground among the opinions in Matal v. Tam,
even though there is no single opinion for the Court as a whole.240
This suggests another path that could, potentially, have unified the
Supreme Court.
The dispute between the two plurality opinions—one authored
by Justice Alito and one by Justice Kennedy—reflects, as noted, an
ongoing dispute within the Supreme Court over the proper

commercial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a
component of that activity” (internal quotations omitted)).
237. See, e.g., id. at 11 n.9 (internal citation omitted) (emphasizing that
when dealing with restrictions on commercial speech, we “frame our decisions
narrowly” (internal citation omitted)).
238. Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d 1321, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
239. Id. at 1339.
240. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017); id. at 1765 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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application of its commercial speech cases.241 This is a debate that
threads through many recent Supreme Court decisions. The
Justices could not reach an agreement because they were narrowly
focused on a dispute over “intermediate scrutiny” versus “strict
scrutiny,” an important and unsettled issue in First Amendment
law generally in the commercial speech context.
Reaching agreement on the proper level of scrutiny is
extremely difficult because Justices are, understandably, wary in
making any statement about the impact that the particular
wording could have in the many different commercial and political
environments in which free speech issues are now raised.
In this case, however, the narrow focus in both plurality
opinions on the dispute over the proper level of scrutiny obscured
the important areas of common ground in Matal v. Tam.242 As a
result, the decision produced no new or useful statement about
First Amendment law.
One wonders whether the Court could have reached consensus
by stepping back from the “standard of scrutiny” debate and,
instead, embracing the chance to agree on an important common
principle that all shared. In particular, the Court would have been
on sound constitutional ground in holding—flatly but narrowly—
that in those rare cases in which a government rule is, by its terms,
a clear and explicit “viewpoint-based” restriction on the content of
private speech, the statute is unconstitutional on its face.
Instead, Justice Alito noted that the Federal Circuit Court
reasoned that “even if” the commercial speech “intermediate
scrutiny” test applied, section 2(a) would fail, while Justice
Kennedy insisted that “strict scrutiny” must apply.243 Justice
Thomas agreed with both Justice Alito and Justice Kennedy that
“strict scrutiny” must apply and that the law failed even the
“intermediate scrutiny” test.244 This was a missed opportunity to
come together on a basic constitutional principle that is important,
non-controversial, and unrelated to the proper level of scrutiny.
Indeed, the voting Justices all recognized that the level of
scrutiny is irrelevant here because section 2(a) fails constitutional
241. Id. at 1765, 1768 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
242. Id. at 1765; id. at 1763–64 (Alito, J., plurality opinion).
243. Id. at 1754 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion); id. at 1765 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
244. Id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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scrutiny under any test.245 But that insight was not embodied into
a clear statement of law joined by the Court as a whole. Instead,
the opinions devolved into another variation of the ongoing debate
about standards of scrutiny. But the truth here—as evidenced by
the unanimous outcome—that Section 2(a)’s “disparagement”
provision was patently unconstitutional on its face. Why not
declare as much?
While flat rules are rarely appropriate, a flat rule prohibiting
the government from engaging in clear and explicit viewpointbased discrimination against private speech is sustainable here
because there is no valid ground on which the government can
censor particular private viewpoints. To provide a valid basis for
suppressing speech, the government’s reason must be “viewpointneutral.”246 Where a law censors a particular private viewpoint, as
a logical matter, it cannot be justified without explaining why the
government believes that viewpoint should be censored.
The proposed holding here would be narrow. Rules that
restrict speech that incites violence or poses an immediate danger
to public safety or welfare (such as yelling “fire” in a crowded
theater) are already excluded from free speech protections.247 First
Amendment doctrine has also eliminated from free speech
challenges certain valid regulatory restrictions that might arguably
be seen as “viewpoint-based,” such as those prohibiting deceptive or
misleading speech. Such speech enjoys no free speech rights and
may be freely banned or regulated by the government without
implicating First Amendment concerns.248 Only truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech gets protection under the Free
245. Id. at 1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1769 (Thomas, J.,
concurring); id. at 1763 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion).
246. Cf. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)
(explaining that “content-neutral” speech regulations are “those that
are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech” (internal
quotations omitted)).
247. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340–41 (1974)
(defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First
Amendment); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (obscenity is not
protected by the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571–72 (1942) (“fighting words” are not protected by the First
Amendment).
248. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475
(1989) (“For commercial speech to come within [the First Amendment], it at
least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.” (citation omitted)).

164 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:122
Speech clause.
Whether a particular government rule is properly understood
to be an explicit viewpoint-based restriction on otherwise lawful
private speech may, of course, require statutory interpretation.249
But once a rule is properly characterized as such, which should be
a very narrow category of rules, any rationale offered by the
government cannot possibly be viewpoint-neutral, since it will by
definition argue that private expression of the particular viewpoint
poses alleged public hazards.
Consider, for example, a traffic rule that generally allowed
private citizens to display bumper stickers on their cars, but barred
those bumper stickers that advocate for abortion rights. Such a rule
would be patently unconstitutional. Such a law could not, for
example, be constitutionally validated by government concerns that
abortion-rights messages will distract or arouse anger in other
motorists and thereby cause a traffic hazard. Banning a message
because it is offensive to others is simply another form of
unconstitutional viewpoint-based discrimination.250 Surely, the
Court would not have to agree on the proper level of scrutiny to
declare such a law flatly unconstitutional.
The same principle holds true in the commercial speech
context. Consider a government regulation regulating advertising
by lawyers that generally allowed truthful, non-misleading ads, but
prohibited lawyer ads that criticize judges. A regulation that
permits lawyers to publish ads that praise judges, but not ads that
criticize judges, would be an explicitly viewpoint-based restriction.
Is there any valid government rationale that could justify such a
law?251
249. See, e.g., Matal, 137 S. Ct. 1744.
250.
See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (noting that
otherwise lawful speech “cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or
arouses contempt”); Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134
(1992) (“Listeners’ reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for
regulation.” (citation omitted)); cf. Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d 1321, 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The legal significance of viewpoint discrimination is the same
whether the government disapproves of the message or claims that some part
of the populace will disapprove of the message.”).
251.
By contrast, a regulation that applied only to advertising by lawyers
—a speaker-based and perhaps content-based regulation—could legitimately
be adopted as part of a comprehensive scheme regulating the legal profession,
since this restriction only makes sense in the context of the particular
regulatory scheme.
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The Matal v. Tam case itself provides a prime example of the
government’s near-impossible task of articulating a valid
government interest to support a restriction on speech that is, on
its face, viewpoint-based.252 In the Supreme Court, the
government advanced two interests in support of Section 2(a)’s
disparagement clause: its interest in rejecting trademarks that
contain “demeaning messages”; and its interest in ensuring the
“orderly flow of commerce.”253 As it turns out, however, both were
simply thinly-veiled versions of the government’s view that
trademarks like “The Slants” are just too offensive to qualify for the
benefits of trademark registration.254
Consider, for example, the government argument in the
Supreme Court that it has a valid interest in preventing
underrepresented groups from being “bombarded with demeaning
messages in commercial advertising.”255 A variation of this
rationale was also offered in the Federal Circuit, where the
government advanced its interest in preventing the registration of
“vile racial epithets and images” and in “dissociating itself from
speech that it finds odious.”256 As Justice Alito observed, however,
“no matter how the point is phrased, its unmistakable thrust is this:
The Government has an interest in preventing speech expressing
ideas that offend.”257 And this, he argued, “strikes at the heart of
the First Amendment.”258
Nor did the government’s alternative rationale—that allowing
disparaging trademarks interrupts the “orderly flow of
commerce”259—fare better. The government posited in its Supreme
Court argument that commerce is “disrupted” by trademarks that
252.
Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1761–63 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion).
253. Id. at 1764.
254. Id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
255. Id. at 1764 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion).
256. Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d 1321, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(summarizing the government’s arguments in its briefs that it should be
entitled to refuse registration to trademarks that include “the most vile racial
epithets and images,” that incorporate “racial slurs,” that use “religious
insults, ethnic caricatures, misogynistic images, or any other disparaging
terms or logos,” or that generally use speech that the government “finds
odious.” (citations omitted)).
257. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion).
258. Id.; see also Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1336 (noting that the
government is “underscoring its hostility to these messages”).
259. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1764.
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“involv[e] disparagement of race, gender, ethnicity, national origin,
religion,
sexual
orientation,
and
similar
demographic
classification.”260 The government’s theory, apparently, was that
when the content of commercial speech “may lead to political or
social ‘volatility,’” such speech may properly be suppressed.261 Like
the first rationale, however, this justification expressly relies on the
alleged harms to commerce that flow from the disparaging message
expressed by the specific marks that are banned. This is not a
viewpoint-neutral rationale.262
Had there been any neutral rationale the government could
have found to support this rule, it certainly would have been offered
here. Instead, the government focused its fire on trying to argue
that the First Amendment did not apply at all.263
In sum, rather than leaving the constitutional analysis at the
final threshold, the Court as a whole should have been able to agree
and clearly state, as a Court, that where, as here, there is an
explicit, clear “viewpoint-based” burden on otherwise lawful private
speech, the law is unconstitutional on its face and there is no need
to debate the standard of scrutiny. The Court should have held that
in those very rare circumstances in which the government has
adopted an explicit, clear viewpoint-based restriction on private
speech, that law is unconstitutional, period.
CONCLUSION

The Matal v. Tam case presented constitutional free speech
issues that were, at one level, very easy.264 By empowering the
federal government to refuse registration to trademarks it found
“disparaging” to racial or ethnic groups, Section 2(a) embodied a
restriction on speech that was patently unconstitutional.265
260. Id. (citation omitted).
261. Id. at 1765.
262.
Cf. Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1357 (“All of the government’s
proffered interests boil down to permitting the government to burden speech it
finds offensive.”).
263.
See id. at 1336 (“From its enactment in 1946 through its defense of the
statute today, the government has argued that the prohibited marks ought not
to be registered because of the messages the marks convey. When the
government discriminates against speech because it disapproves of the
message conveyed by the speech, it discriminates on the basis of viewpoint.”).
264.
Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1757 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion).
265.
Id.
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Trademarks like “The Slants,” which are derogatory to AsianAmericans, were denied registration, while trademarks
complimentary of Asians, like “Asian Efficiency,” were registered.
There is no question that such patent and explicit government
viewpoint-discrimination violates the First Amendment’s Free
Speech Clause, and the Court so agreed. Nor did any of the Justices
buy into the government’s argument that registering trademarks
turns them from private speech into “government speech.”266
At another level, however, the legal issues in Matal v. Tam
proved impossible for the voting members of the Supreme Court to
agree upon.267 Though they were all clear that Section 2(a) was
unconstitutional, the voting Justices could not agree on a single
opinion for the Court as a whole.268 Instead, the splintered
decisions devolved into disagreements about the complex and very
difficult issue of commercial free speech cases, and the correct level
of scrutiny. This dispute persisted even though all Justices agreed
that Section 2(a)’s disparagement clause could not be justified
under any level of scrutiny.269
This was a missed opportunity. As this case shows, there are
rare circumstances in which a law on its face violates the Free
Speech Clause. The Court missed an opportunity to make a clear
statement of this narrow but fundamental point of law. However,
the debate is far from over.
Even in this very narrow area of trademark law, there are
other aspects of Section 2(a) that are vulnerable to a very similar
free speech challenge. In particular, Section 2(a) also allows the
government to refuse to register trademarks that are “immoral” or
“scandalous.”270 The Federal Circuit en banc in the Tam case
predicted that the outcome of this case might well doom those other
aspects of Section 2(a) as well.271 They were right. Expect further
266. Id. at 1760.
267.
See id. at 1751 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion); id. at 1765 (Alito, J.)
(plurality opinion).
268.
See id. at 1751 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion).
269.
Id. at 1764 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion).
270.
See supra text accompanying note 4 (quoting the text of Section 2(a)
in full).
271.
See Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1330 n.1 (“We limit our
holding in this case to the constitutionality of the § 2(a) disparagement
provision. Recognizing, however, that other portions of § 2 may likewise
constitute government regulation of expression based on message, such as the
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litigation. The debate is not yet over.272

exclusions of immoral or scandalous marks, we leave to future panels the
consideration of the § 2 provisions other than the disparagement provision at
issue here.” (emphasis added)).
272.
Since the Tam decision was issued by the Supreme Court, the Federal
Circuit has already applied that precedent to find the Trademark Act’s bar on
registering “immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks to be unconstitutional under
the Free Speech Clause. See In Re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
In Brunetti, the Federal Circuit espoused the same constitutional theory that
Judge Moore had originated in the Tam en banc decision—that strict scrutiny
should apply whenever the government regulates the “expressive” aspects of
commercial speech. See id. at 1349 (“Section 2(a) regulates the expressive
components of speech, not the commercial components of speech, and as such
it should be subject to strict scrutiny.”). This constitutional theory, however,
was not endorsed or adopted in any of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Matal
v. Tam. The Supreme Court’s failure to agree on a common legal rationale in
Matal v. Tam has, clearly, left open key issues concerning the proper approach
to free speech rights in the arena of commercial speech.

